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CASE NOTES
INDIAN LAW- Tribal Authority to Levy a Mineral Severance Tax on Non.
Indian Lessees. Merrion v. Jicerilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).

Indian lands have become a focal point for the exploration
and development of previously ignored deposits of energy
resources. The United States Supreme Court, in Merrion v.
JicarillaApache TribeI has recognized the right of the Indian
tribes to benefit from the wealth generated by mineral
development on tribal land. Merrion is a reaffirmation of
existing law governing tribal sovereignty. This note will consider the historical background of tribal authority to tax nonIndians engaged in economic activity on reservation land, and
examine the approach taken by the Supreme Court to analyze
the extent of inherent tribal sovereignty.
2
The Jicarilla Tribe inhabits an executive order reservation
situated in northwest New Mexico. Petitioners, J. Gregory
Merrion and Robert L. Bayless, entered into mineral leases for
the recovery of oil and gas with the Jicarilla Tribe. In 1968, the
Jicarilla Tribal Council adopted a revised constitution which
granted the Tribal Council the authority to pass ordinances to
govern the development of tribal resources.3 The revised constitution was adopted pursuant to the Indian Reorganization
Act of 19344 and was approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.

On July 9, 1976, the Tribal Council adopted the Jicarilla Oil
and Natural Gas Severance Tax, designed to apply to "any oil
and natural gas severed, saved and removed from tribal
lands." 5 The tax was due at the date of severance and was
payable monthly by the non-Indian lessees. 6 The tax was at the
wellhead per million BTU of natural gas and per barrel of
Copyright@ 1983 by the University of Wyoming.
1. 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
2. Executive order reservations do not involve treaties or acts of Congress, but are

designated by the President for particular tribes. "Generally, property rights in
executive order reservations are similar to those in reservations created pursuant to
treaty or statute .... F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 493 (1982).

3. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. at 134-35 (1982) (citing REVISED CONSTITUTION OF THE JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE art. XI, S 1).
4. Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, 25 U.S.C. SS 476-477 (1976) (permits tribes to

organize and adopt a constitution under section 16).
5. 455 U.S. at 136 (1982). JICARILLA APACHE TRIBE, TRIBAL COUNCIL ORDINANCE No.

77-0-02 amended by No. 77-0-195 and Res. 77-327.
6. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 539 (10th Cir. 1980).
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crude oil "sold or transported off the Reservation." 7 The trial
court found that the tax would generate over two million
dollars annually for the Jicarilla Tribe." In addition to the tribal
severance tax, at the time the Supreme Court granted certiorari the state of New Mexico imposed six different taxes on
oil and gas equipment and production. 9
In two separate actions consolidated by the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico, the non-Indian
lessees filed suit to enjoin enforcement and collection of the
tax by either the Secretary of the Interior or the Jicarilla
Tribal Council. 10 The District Court found the severance tax illegal and void. 1 The court held that the tribe lacked the power
to levy the tax under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.
The 1934 Act was interpreted to give tribes adopting a constitution thereunder only those powers specifically named,12
along with powers that were vested in a tribe by existing law.
The court found that the power to tax non-Indians was not
among the specifically defined powers and was not vested in
the Jicarilla Tribe by any existing law. 13
The district court also agreed with the non-Indian lessees
that the power to impose the mineral severance tax was vested
exclusively with local and state authorities. 14 This conclusion
was based on a 1927 Act of Congress which permits state taxation of mineral lessees in executive order reservations. 15 The
non-Indian lessees argued that Congress had struck a compromise between the interests of the state and the Indian tribe
by granting the states the right to tax production, while granting the Indian tribes the royalties, rentals and bonus income
7. Id
8. Id. at 539-40.
9. The Oil and Gas Severance Tax, N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 7-29-1 to-22 (Supp. 1980); The Oil
and Gas Conservation Tax, N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 7-30-1 to-26 (Supp. 1980); The Oil and
Gas Emergency School Tax, N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 7-31-1 to-25 (Supp. 1980); The Oil and
Gas Ad Valorem Production Tax, N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 7-32-1 to-27 (Supp. 1980); The
Natural Gas Processors Tax, N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 7-33-1 to-22 (Supp. 1980); The Oil and
Gas Production Equipment Ad Valorem Tax, N.M. STAT. ANN. SS 7-34-1 to-20 (Supp.
1980).
10. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 5 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN LAW TRAINING PROGRAM) (D.C.N.M. Dec. 29, 1977).
11. Id. at F-27, 28.
12. COHEN, supra note 2, at 149.
13. 5 INDIAN L. REP. at F-27.
14. Id. at F-26.
15. 25 U.S.C. S 398(c) (1976). This act permits state taxation of mineral production on reservation lands.
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from oil and gas leases on their reservations. 16 Finally, the
petitioners argued, and the court agreed, that because the tax
was levied only against oil and gas sold or removed from the
reservation, the tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce in violation of the commerce clause."
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the district court.1 8
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the Jicarilla Tribe that their
power to tax was an inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty
which had not been surrendered by the tribe in any treaty.1 9
No act of the federal government limited or destroyed the
tribe's ability to tax non-Indians conducting business on reservation land. 20 Finally, the court found no violation of the commerce clause. 21 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals.
LEGAL BACKGROUND

A review of the applicable case law will demonstrate that
Merrion is consistent with past judicial decisions upholding
tribal sovereignty. Indian tribes have a singular relationship
with the federal government. An early Supreme Court decision characterized Indian tribes as "domestic dependent nations. ' 2 Chief Justice Marshall stated:
"[The tribes] look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief
and address the President as their great
to their 2wants;
4
father."
This stance has been interpreted in later cases to mean that
the relationship of Indian tribes to the federal government
resembles that of a ward to a guardian. The only specific con16. Brief for the Petitioners at 19, Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,

(1982).
17. 5 INDIAN L. REP. at F-28. U.S. CONST. art. I. S 8, cl. 3 provides: "The Congress shall have
Power To... regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
."
and with Indian Tribes....

18. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980).
19. Id. at 540-44.
20. Id. at 546-49.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Id. at 544-46.
617 F.2d 537, cert. granted, 449 U.S. 820 (1980), aftd, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
Id.
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stitutional mention of congressional power over Indian affairs
is contained in the commerce clause, which authorizes Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. 25 However,
the federal government exercises broad plenary powers of control over Indian tribes, 26 based on the dependent status of the
tribes.
As early as 1832, the Supreme Court, in Worcester v.
Georgia,2 7 recognized that Indian tribes were unique independent communities possessing powers of self-government that
derived from aboriginal tribal sovereignty. Aboriginal
sovereignty arises from the fact that Indians existed as independent entities prior to colonization. 28 The Court held that
Indian nations did not relinquish their rights to self government and independence simply by associating with the United
States. 9 This case has stood for the proposition that Indian
tribes possess attributes of inherent sovereignty over both
their territory and their members.30
Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed tribal authority to tax non-Indians in Morris v. Hitchcock.31 At issue in Morris was a privilege or permit tax regulating the importation of
livestock by non-members into the Chickasaw Reservation.
The Court upheld the tax recognizing that the taxing power
was designed both to prevent unwanted intrusion and to serve
as an instrument for raising revenue.3 2 The right to tax was
found to be an acceptable method of raising revenue to pay for
the cost of government. In addition, the Court reasoned that
because no non-Indian can lawfully be within reservation land
without authorization from the tribe, the Indians have the
ability to dictate the grounds upon which such authorization
33
will be issued.
Buster v. Wright,34 an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
decision, was a significant reaffirmation of the inherent ability
25. U.S. CONST. art. 1, S 8.
26. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 271 U.S. 467 (1926). The Ramsey Court stated: "Congress possesses the broad power of legislating for the protection of the Indians wherever
they may be within the territory of the United States ..
" Id. at 471.
27. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832).
28. MAXFIELD, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW ON AMERICAN INDIAN LANDs 3 (1977).

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 560.
Id. at 518, 559. See COHEN, supra note 2, at 220, 233-35.
194 U.S. 384 (1904).
Id. at 389.
Id. at 391 (quoting 23 Op. Att'y Gen. 216-27 (1900)).
135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
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of Indian tribes to impose a tax on non-Indians for the privilege
of conducting business on Indian land. Non-Indians, owners of
property within the Creek Reservation, brought suit to enjoin
the Interior Department and the Creek Tribe from evicting
them for the non-payment of the required Indian tax. In this
case the Indians were prohibited from removing the nonIndians by an Act of Congress."5 The court concluded that the
tribe nevertheless retained its authority to tax. The power to
tax was held to be firmly rooted in the sovereign authority of
the tribe:
The authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the
terms upon which noncitizens may transact business
within its borders did not have its origin in an act of
Congress, treaty, or agreement of the United States. It
and essential attributes of its
was one of the inherent
36
original sovereignty.
Payment of the tax was considered by the court to be a condition on engaging in trade on Indian land. Buster supports the
conclusion that tribal authority to tax is based on an inherent
element of the sovereignty the tribe enjoyed prior to coloniza37
tion and not just on the tribe's ability to exclude non-Indians.
More recent cases have continued to uphold the ability of
tribes to impose taxes on non-Indians engaged in economic activity within reservation lands. In Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux
Tribe,38 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals endorsed an
Oglala Tribal tax on non-members for the privilege of grazing
on tribal land. The court found that tribes exist as sovereign
entities that possess inherent rights, including the power to
levy taxes to maintain tribal government, except where limited
by Congress.39 Shortly thereafter, the same court, in Bartav.
OglalaSioux Tribe,40 reaffirmed the grazing tax in the face of
a constitutional challenge. The non-Indian lessee claimed the
tax was a deprivation of property and was limited by due pro35. Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 259. The Act reads: "[I]t shall hereafter be
unlawful to remove or deport any person from the Indian Territory who is in lawful

possession of any lots or parcels of land in any town or city in the Indian Territory which

has been designated as a townsite under existing laws and treaties."
36. 135 F. at 950.
37. Id. at 951, 952.
38. 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956).
39. Id. at 99.
40. 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959).
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cess considerations. 41 Barta is significant because it involved
the taxation of non-Indians with pre-existing leases who could
not legally be removed from tribal lands.
In the latest series of cases to test a tribe's inherent
sovereignty, the United States Supreme Court has declined to
depart from the reasoning of past decisions. The Court, in
United States v. Mazurie,42 acknowledged that "[I]ndian tribes
within 'Indian country' are a good deal more than 'private,
voluntary organizations'. . . .,,43 The Court also noted that
previous Supreme Court decisions had uniformly protected the
44
authority of Indian governments over their territory.
In Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Reservation,45 the Supreme Court reiterated that taxation is a fundamental attribute of tribal sovereignty: "The power to tax
transactions occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of
sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by
federal law or necessary implication of their dependent
status. ' 46 The Court expressly rejected the theory that the
tribe's power to tax was limited to its power as a landowner to
exclude non-Indians. The Colville decision emphasized that Indian tribes exercise congressionally sanctioned powers of self47
government.
The Supreme Court has limited tribal authority over nonIndians on non-Indian land within the reservation. In Montana
v. United States the Court held that the Crow Tribe had no
power to regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing within the
reservation on land owned in fee by non-members of the
tribe. 48 The Crow Tribe claimed the power to prohibit hunting
and fishing on lands within the reservation owned in fee by
non-members was an incident of the inherent sovereignty of
the tribe over the entire Crow Reservation. 49 The State of
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 556. See Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. SS
419 U.S. 544 (1975).
Id. at 557.
Id. at 558 (citing Williams v. Lee, 388 U.S. 217, 223
447 U.S. 134 (1980).
Id. at 152.
Id. at 153.
450 U.S. 544 (1981). See Note, Ownership of Lands
Limits to Tribal Sovereignty, 17 LAND & WATER L.
49. 450 U.S. at 547.
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Montana asserted its authority to regulate hunting and fishing
by non-Indians on land owned by non-Indians within the reservation.50
The Court found any exercise of tribal power in excess of
what is required to protect Indian self-government or to
regulate internal conduct inconsistent with the tribe's dependent status.5 1 No clear relation was established between the
regulation of hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian
fee land and tribal self-government or internal relations.
However, in dictum the Court limited its holding and found
that the Crow Tribe had the power to tax, license or similarly
regulate the activities of non-members who enter into consensual relationships with the tribe by means of leases, contracts
or other commercial dealings.5 2 The language in the opinion indicated that the tribe also has the inherent power to regulate
non-Indians on fee land within the reservation when the nonto or has a direct effect on a
Indian activity poses a threat
53
interest.
tribal
significant
THE Merrion DECISION

The United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the Court of Appeals and upheld the Jicarilla Tribe's mineral
severance tax. After examining both positions, the Court
found little authority to support a theory denying tribes the
power to tax non-Indians. At the outset, Justice Marshall
reviewed the Colville analysis, which was that Indian tribes
have the power to tax affairs which significantly involve a tribe
or its members until divested of it by federal law or necessary
implication." The taxing power is an inherent attribute of Indian sovereignty for the reason that the power to raise
revenue to provide for governmental services is a vital element
of self-government. 55 The Court found that the tax at issue in
this case is of a type often employed by other governmental
bodies to provide for services similar to those assured by the
Id. at 549.
Id,. at 564.
Id. at 565.
Id. at 566. See Knight v. Shoshone and Arapahoe Indian Tribes, 670 F.2d 900 (10th Cir.
1982), for an example of the further erosion of Montana (followed Montana dicta to
uphold tribal zoning laws).
54. 455 U.S. at 137.
55. Id.
50.
51.
52.
53.
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Jicarilla Tribal Council.56 The lessees availed themselves of the

benefits of organized society within the Indian reservation,
and the Court found nothing unusual in requiring the non7
Indian lessees to contribute to the cost of tribal government.5
The tribe's interest in taxing non-Indians to provide
revenue for essential services is most clear when the taxed
transactions involve the tribe and take place on reservation
land, where the taxpayer receives the benefit of tribal
services.58 The Court found no significance in the fact that the
Jicarilla Tribe was simultaneously the government imposing
the taxes and also the commercial partner receiving rents and
royalties from the mineral leases taxed. Justice Marshall noted
that state governments regularly receive both royalty
payments and severance taxes from lessees within state
borders. 59
According to the majority opinion, all three branches of
the federal government assumed that the tribe's taxing power
is an essential element of self-determination. 60 The Court,
citing Colville, found that executive orders have reiterated the
position that an Indian tribe's civil jurisdiction over nonIndians engaged in activities in which the tribe has a significant stake encompasses the ability to tax. 61 Similarly, Congress has recognized the tribal power to tax as inherent to selfgovernment and territorial control. 62 Consistent with this

point of view, Supreme Court decisions have repeatedly
guaranteed the Indians' inherent sovereign right to selfgovernment, which includes the power to levy taxes.63 The fact
that the federal government can divest the tribe of its power to
tax and that the tribe must obtain Interior Department approval before taxing non-members, gave the Court adequate
reassurances that the recognized power to tax would not be
misused. 64
56. Id. at 138.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 139.
61. Id. (citing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447
U.S. at 152-53).
62. 455 U.S. at 139.
63. Id. at 140.
64. Id. at 141.
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Next, the Court went beyond what was necessary to
uphold the severance tax and rejected the claim that tribal
authority to tax non-Indians was based solely on the tribe's
power to exclude non-Indians from reservation land. That
assertion, the Court found, was inconsistent with the idea of
the tribe's retained sovereignty as well as with the recognition
65
that the taxing power is a necessary tool for raising revenue.
The majority also rejected the dissent's reading of Morris,
Buster, and Maxey v. Wright, that the taxing power was based
in the tribe's power to exclude non-Indians. 66 While the Court
acknowledged that the power to exclude was a benchmark of
Indian sovereignty, it held none of the cases cited stood for the
proposition that the power to tax was grounded solely in the
power to exclude. 67 The simple fact that tribal authority to tax
does not arise until the non-member enters tribal jurisdiction
does not require that the power to tax be based on the tribe's
power to exclude all non-members. 68
Even assuming that the authority to tax results from the
right to exclude non-members from tribal land, the majority
said the Indian tribe still has the power to impose the contested
tax. 69 The Court held that the ability to exclude must by definition include the power to maintain conditions upon residence. 0
A tribe does not lose the authority to tax merely because that
power was not exercised at the outset of the relationship with
the non-Indian.71 The theory that a tribe's ability to tax is
dependent on its ability to exclude confuses the role of the
tribe as an economic participant with the role of the tribe as
sovereign. The tribe's receipt of royalties as the lessor of
mineral leases does not amount to an abandonment of its
powers to tax as a sovereign. 72 Additionally, the Court found
that a policy which required the consent of the non-Indian to be
taxed deprived the Indians of their sovereign power. 73 The
65. Id.
66. Id. See supra notes 31, 34; Maxey v. Wright, Indian Terr. 243, 54 S.W. 807 (1900), af'd,
105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900).
67. 455 U.S. at 141.
68. Id. at 142.
69. Id. at 144.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 145.
72. Id. at 146.
73. Id. at 147.
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Court ruled that a sovereign power does not waive the right to
tax by silence. 4
The non-Indian lessees also sought to prove that Congress
had implicitly preempted the tribe's authority to tax mineral
transactions on reservation lands. Petitioners first pointed to a
1938 act of Congress which outlined the procedures to be
5
followed for leasing oil and gas interests on tribal land.1
Although petitioners argued that any tribal taxation was inconsistent with the provisions of the Act, the Court found that
this provision should not be interpreted to limit tribal action
under the Indian Reorganization Act.7 6 The lessees also
asserted that Congress withdrew tribal taxing power by
authorizing states to tax production from leases within reservation boundaries. 77 The Court stated that the lessee's contention was in conflict with the settled principle that different
78
sovereigns have the power to tax the same transaction.
In the final segment of its opinion, the Court ruled that the
Jicarilla mineral severance tax did not violate the negative implications of the commerce clause.7 9 At the outset, the Court
noted the difficulties in examining tribal conduct under the interstate commerce clause or the Indian commerce clause.8s
However, after assuming that the interstate commerce clause
did apply, the Court found that the negative implications
analysis is only appropriate when Congress has not acted to
regulate. 81 In this case, Congress has acted by providing for
procedures to be followed before a tribal tax could be put into
effect. 82 Even if judicial scrutiny had been found to be appropriate, the challenged mineral severance tax would
survive.8 3 Citing the four part test in Complete Auto Transit,
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 148.
Id. at 150 (citing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. SS 396a-396g (1976)).
455 U.S. at 150 (citing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. S 396b (1976)).
455 U.S. at 150 (citing Act of 1927, 25 U.S.C. S 398c (1976)).
455 U.S. at 151.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 153. "Commerce with Indian tribes need not be 'interstate' in character or impact
as the Indian Commerce Clause is a separate provision from the portion of the Commerce
Clause dealing with interstate commerce." COHEN, supra note 2, at 208.
81. 455 U.S. at 154.
82. Id. at 155.
83. Id. at 156.
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Inc. v. Brady,8 4 the Court found no unconstitutional burden on
interstate commerce. 8 5

Merrion EXAMINED
Merrion v. JicarillaApache Tribe is a logical extension of
earlier decisions which reaffirmed Indian tribes' rights to
sovereignty over their territory. Federal court decisions have
consistently upheld the Indians' inherent right to self government, which includes the power to levy taxes.8 6 These rights
are retained by the Indian tribes until limited by federal law or
by implication of the tribe's dependent status,8 7 and not all
tribal powers are implicitly forfeited by virtue of the tribe's
dependent status.88 Past decisions recognize such a divestiture
only when the attempted exercise of tribal sovereignty is at
odds with an overriding national interest, such as if a tribe
were to engage in foreign relations, alienate tribal land to nonIndians without first obtaining federal consent, or prosecute
non-members in tribal court. 89 In the present case, the national
interests in developing new oil reserves, and the interests of
the lessees in resisting an increase in costs of production do not
appear consistent. Furthermore, the Merrion decision is consistent with Montana v. United States, a case which places
limits on tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians. 90 Regardless
of the problems inherent in determining whether a tribal action is inconsistent with a tribe's dependent status, dictum in
Montana contemplates tribal taxation where a consensual relationship exists between a tribe and a non-member, as in Merrion, even if the non-Indian activity takes place on fee land. 91
No Trend to Limit Tribal Sovereignty
The non-Indian lessees attempted unsuccessfully to convince the Supreme Court to place limits on tribal civil jurisdic84. 430 U.S. 274,279 (1977). The Complete Auto TransitCourt held that a state tax is valid if
"the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to

the services provided by the State." Id. See Note, Commerce Clause Standardsfor State
Taxation of MineralSeverance, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 169 (1982).
85. 455 U.S. at 156, 157.
86. See, e.g., Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956); Buster v. Wright,
135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906).
87. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. at 153

(1980)

88. Id.
89. Id. at 153-54.

90. See supra text accompanying note 48.
91. 450 U.S. at 565.
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tion. This attempt was based on the recent Supreme Court
decisions in Oliphantv. Suquamish Indian Tribe92 and United
States v. Wheeler,93 which suggest that Indians lack inherent
power over non-members. These decisions do suggest such a
conclusion. Despite the decisive majority opinion by Justice
Marshall, the fact that the Supreme Court heard oral
arguments twice suggests that Merrion was a more difficult
case than it seems on first impression.
In Wheeler, the United States attempted to prosecute a
Navajo Indian for rape when the Indian had already pleaded
guilty to a charge of contributing to the delinquency of a minor
stemming from the same incident.9 4 The Supreme Court allowed the federal prosecution. Language in the case suggested
that implicit divestiture of sovereignty had occurred in areas
involving the tribe and non-members.9 5 Oliphant concerned
the exercise of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.
This decision implied that although Indian tribes were independent nations at one time, they no longer possess the full at9 6
tributes of sovereignty.

The non-Indian lessees in Merrion contended that the
dependent status of Indian tribes precludes any exercise of
97
taxing powers over non-Indians under Wheeler and Oliphant.
However, those cases do not support that proposition. Wheeler
did, nevertheless, outline the correct framework in which to
view tribal sovereignty.98 The Court in Oliphant expressly
limited its decision to tribal criminal jurisdiction.99 The decision in Merrion went to great lengths to dispel any notion of
expanded limitations on tribal civil jurisdiction.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

435 U.S. 191 (1978).
435 U.S. 313 (1978).
Id. at 315.
Id. at 326. The WhIeeler Court stated: "The areas in which such implicit divestiture has
been held to have occurred are those involving relations between an Indian tribe and
nonmembers of the tribe." Id.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d at 541 (10th Cir. 1980) (citing Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)).
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 16, at 13-15.
"In sum, Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty
or statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status." 435 U.S. at
328.
435 U.S. at 196 n.7.
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ContractualLimits on Severance Taxes
One result of the decision in Merrion is that an oil and gas
lease between a tribe and a non-Indian lessee may not signify
the total economic cost of the venture for the duration of the
project. The Court held that a non-Indian lessee remains subject to a later exercise of sovereign tribal power.' 00 This raised
the question of whether an Indian tribe can agree to a contractual limit on its taxing power in a mineral development lease.
It is questionable whether a tribe's power to contract may be
used to restrict any future tribal government in its exercise of
sovereign taxing powers. Considering that the exercise of
sovereign power is at issue, perhaps an analogy can be drawn
between the case at hand and that of a state in a similar situation. In United States Trust Co. of New York v. New Jersey the
Court stated that the contracts clause does not demand that a
State "adhere to a contract that surrenders an essential attribute of its sovereignty."''10 Taking into consideration the
principle of tribal sovereignty discussed in Merrion and the
congressional commitment to Indian self-determination,1 0 2 one
tribal government should not be allowed to place a contractual
limit on future mineral severance taxes.
Even assuming a tribe were to agree to a contractual limit,
there remains the question of whether the Secretary of the Interior could approve such a limitation. The Court in Merrion
explicitly found that the Secretary must approve any tax on
non-members before the tax will be effective.10 3 However, the
Secretary owes a fiduciary duty to act in the tribe's best interest. This concept first appeared in Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, where the Court held that the Indian's relationship to
the United States was similar to that of a ward to a
guardian. 0 4 That relationship is also conditioned on special
trust obligations which impose strict fiduciary standards. 10
This implies that the Interior Department has a duty to
safeguard the property of Indian tribes in their relations with
third parties. If these standards are applied to the Secretary of
100. 455 U.S. at 145.
101. 435 U.S. 1, 23 (1977). See also Fletcher v. Peck, 2 U.S. (6 Cranch) 328, 336 (1809) ("One
legislature cannot abridge the powers of a succeeding legislature").
102. See supra note 4.
103. 455 U.S. at 141.
104. See supra notes 23, 24.
105. COHEN, supra note 2, at 207.
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the Interior, he might not be acting in the bests interests of the
Indian tribe by approving contractual limitations on mineral
severance taxes.
Assuming increased costs prohibit further mineral
development, the responsibility for settling this issue rests
with Congress. Congress ultimately controls Indian authority
to tax non-Indians on tribal land. 0 6 All tribal sovereign rights
remain subject to divestiture. 10 7 However, as an alternative to
divestiture Congress can use its authority to work a compromise between the competing interests. An example of one
such Congressional attempt is a bill which would make tribal
severance taxes deductible from the windfall profits tax, in
order to eliminate any double taxation.
CONCLUSION

The mineral severance tax imposed by the Jicarilla Tribal
Council is a constitutional exercise of tribal self-government.
The tribe's right of self-government is an inherent attribute of
the sovereignty tribes enjoyed prior to colonization. This
power continues uninterrupted until limited or withdrawn by
Congress.
The Merrion decision is consistent with past decisions
which reaffirm the tribal right to sovereignty over tribal territory. The adjudicial recognition of the inherent right to
regulate non-Indians doing business on tribal lands, beginning
with Worcester, and continuing in Buster and Colville, is firmly
established in Merrion. The right of Indian self-government
would mean considerably less if tribes were prohibited from
taxing economic activities within their borders.
As a final consideration, it should be emphasized that the
power to regulate Indian affairs, including the interactions
between a tribe and non-Indian lessees, is firmly in the grip of
the federal government. However, Congress should pay proper respect to the principles of tribal sovereignty when acting
to balance the competing interests of Indian tribes and nonIndian lessees.
STUART R. DAY
106. See supra notes 25, 26.
107. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. at 137 (1982).
108. 127 CONe. REC. S 700 (daily ed. March 12, 1981).
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